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One of the main criticisms of the criminal division of the Court of Appeal has been 
that it is deficient at identifying and correcting the wrongful convictions of the factually 
innocent. These criticisms stem from the Court’s perceived difficulties in relation to 
appeals based on factual error. The main ground of appeal for errors of fact is fresh 
evidence and these appeals are particularly problematic because they require the 
Court to trespass on the role of the jury somewhat in assessing new evidence on 
appeal against the evidence at trial in order to determine whether the conviction is 
unsafe. The broad consensus is that the Court’s difficulties are caused by three main 
issues: its deference to the jury verdict; its reverence for the principle of finality; and 
the lack of resources to deal with huge numbers appealing. There is less agreement 
in identifying the source of the problems because it is not clear whether they derive 
from legislative powers or the interpretation of those powers by the judiciary. This 
article uses both qualitative and quantitative empirical research in order to try to 
determine what the Court’s approach is in fresh evidence appeals and, if there are 
problems, whether it is the law or the interpretation of the law by the judiciary which is 
to blame. It also proposes reforms designed to make it easier for the Court to rectify 
miscarriages of justice.  
 




One of the consistent criticisms of the criminal division of the Court of Appeal has been that 
it is deficient at rectifying the wrongful convictions of the factually innocent.1 The role of the 
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Court of Appeal is not to declare people innocent as the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 
(amending the Criminal Appeal Act 1968) gives the Court of Appeal the power to quash a 
conviction if it thinks it is ‘unsafe.’2 There are two interpretations of ‘unsafe,’ and one 
interpretation has applied to a factually innocent person who has been, or may be, 
wrongfully convicted.3 There are various judgments where the Court has expressed a view 
that it felt that an innocent person had been wrongly convicted, or at the very least that an 
injustice had occurred,4 but as this is not part of its legally defined role these 
pronouncements are rare. There is a presumption of innocence in the English and Welsh 
legal system,5 but this is a technical term which requires the prosecution to prove its case 
beyond reasonable doubt; if the prosecution case fails, the defendant is legally but not 
necessarily factually innocent.6  
The main criticisms of the Court stem from its perceived difficulties in relation to 
appeals based on factual error. The main ground of appeal for errors of fact is fresh 
evidence and these appeals are particularly problematic because they require the Court to 
trespass on the fact-finding role of the jury somewhat in assessing new evidence on appeal 
against the evidence presented at trial in order to determine whether the conviction is 
unsafe.7 There appears to be a broad consensus that the Court’s problems in determining 
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factual error appeals are caused by too much deference being shown to the jury verdict,8 
undue reverence to the principle of finality,9 and a lack of resources that has led to the fear 
that the floodgates would open and there would be a deluge of applications to appeal which 
the Court could not cope with.10 Whilst there appears to be a consensus on the problems, 
the difficulty is identifying the source of the problems because it is not clear whether they 
derive from the legislative powers the judiciary have been given or their interpretation of 
those powers.  
 As a result of the Court’s problems in determining factual error appeals, in common 
with other legal jurisdictions, this has meant that it is far easier to succeed on an appeal 
based on procedural irregularity in England and Wales than it is for an appeal based on 
fresh evidence.11 This explains why more appeals are brought on the basis of irregularities 
and why more convictions are quashed on that basis. This is also explained by there being a 
twenty-eight day time limit after conviction to lodge a ‘notice of an application for leave to 
appeal’ which can be extended at the discretion of the Court of Appeal, the Registrar or the 
Deputy Registrar.12 It is very difficult to find fresh evidence in twenty-eight days so the 
appellant’s grounds of appeal at first instance tend to be those alleging procedural errors. 
This succeeds in reinforcing the importance of procedural irregularities on appeal and 
downplays arguments of factual error. In applications relying purely on a claim of factual 
innocence there may be little on which to progress the case if there are no legal or 
procedural arguments or they have been argued and the appeal has failed. The difficulty 
then arises of the defendant having to locate fresh evidence in order to succeed on appeal. 
In most cases, the appellant will have to apply to the Criminal Cases Review Commission 
(CCRC) to refer the case back to the Court of Appeal which is not an easy task.13 
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This article uses both qualitative and quantitative empirical research in order to try to 
determine what the Court’s approach is in fresh evidence appeals and if there are problems, 
it seeks to determine whether it is the wording of the law or the interpretation of the law by 
the judiciary which is to blame. In order to place the empirical research in context, it is 
necessary to outline the law and historical approaches to fresh evidence appeals.  
 
Historical approaches to fresh evidence appeals 
The history of criminal appeals in England and Wales reveals a familiar pattern of crisis, 
caused by high profile miscarriages of justice, and reform.14 The creation of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal15 in the Criminal Appeal Act (CAA) 1907 was described by JUSTICE as ‘the 
product of one of the longest and hardest fought campaigns in the history of law reform.’16 
Several reports were published between 1844 and 1906 criticising the law and suggesting 
reform, usually in the wake of high profile miscarriages of justice. It took 31 bills before the 
Court was finally created.17 The main opponents to reform at the time proved to be the 
judiciary with various reports from the period revealing that the judges were not opposed to a 
criminal appeal system as such, as the judiciary did not object to their decisions being 
reviewed in relation to sentences or questions of law, but were clearly very hostile to an 
appeal system based on errors of fact.18 The reasons given by the judges were to resonate 
through the history of criminal appeals and can be summed up as follows: they did not 
believe that innocent people were convicted;19 they felt that it would lessen the responsibility 
felt by jurors who would be less reluctant to convict on doubtful evidence if they knew the 
decision could be appealed;20 they felt a right of appeal would lessen the deterrent effect of 
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the criminal law;21 and they felt that there were insufficient numbers of judges to handle the 
anticipated volume of appeals.22 
In the absence of an appeal system for errors of fact, the prerogative of mercy was 
the mechanism for rectifying miscarriages of justice. The Home Secretary could grant a free 
pardon which was a declaration of innocence.23 One of the reasons it took so long to 
establish the Court was that it was felt it was not needed as long as the Home Secretary had 
this power to remedy injustice. However, the cases of Adolf Beck and George Edalji 
revealed the deficiencies in the procedure when the Home Office rejected sixteen attempts 
by Beck to have his conviction reviewed. This case, and others,24 showed that a criminal 
appeal system based on errors of fact was urgently needed. 
 The Court was originally given wide powers under section 9 of the CAA 1907 to 
admit evidence on appeal25 but the judges chose to interpret those powers narrowly and 
imposed hurdles from the civil law such as: that evidence had to be credible and relevant to 
the issue of guilt,26 that the evidence had to be admissible,27 and that the evidence could not 
have been put before the jury.28 The case of R v Parks29 showed that the Court was initially 
applying an objective test in deciding fresh evidence appeals by analysing the influence that 
fresh evidence may have had on the original jury, or a reasonable jury but obviously without 
having heard the evidence itself. Lord Parker CJ alluded to why the Court would take a 
restrictive approach to fresh evidence appeals, ‘it is only rarely that this court allows further 
evidence to be called, and it is quite clear that the principles upon which this court acts must 
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be kept within narrow confines, otherwise in every case this court would be in effect asked to 
effect a new trial.’30  
 As the Court is a review Court it does not have the power to rehear the case. 
Therefore, Lord Parker was correct in that it cannot perform a retrial with the new evidence. 
The problems of being restricted by a review function were exacerbated in the Court’s early 
years by it not having the power to order a retrial as demonstrated by two high profile cases 
of R v Rowland31 and R v Devlin and Burns,32 where the Court refused to hear new evidence 
because to do so would usurp the function of the jury. In the absence of the ability to order a 
new trial, an inquiry by the Home Secretary was ordered into both cases to review the 
convictions. As a result of these cases, the issue of retrials was raised by the then Lord 
Chief Justice, Lord Goddard in the House of Lords in 1952. The debate centred on the issue 
of fresh evidence and the problem highlighted by Lord Goddard was the Court of Criminal 
Appeal considering fresh evidence rather than a second jury, ‘but how could we, without 
usurping the functions of a jury, which is something our Court has always refused to do.’33 
The almost unanimous conclusion of the participants in the 1952 debate was that a new trial 
was the appropriate forum in which to hear significant fresh evidence, especially of events 
that had occurred post-conviction. It was anticipated that the power would be ‘used very 
sparingly…in proper cases.’34  
 In 1952, the Tucker Committee was set up to review the issue of retrials.35 The 
Committee was unanimous in proposing that the Court should be given the power to order a 
retrial in cases which involved fresh evidence but this was not implemented until ten years 
after it reported. This was possibly due to the lack of public interest as public pressure is 
usually the catalyst for reforming the appeal process. Indeed, it was the high profile case of 
Aloysius ‘Lucky’ Gordon36 in 1963 which provided the impetus needed for implementing the 
Tucker Committee proposal as the case ‘served to crystallise a growing uneasiness about 
the limitations of the Court.’37  
 The Court was given the power to order a retrial in fresh evidence appeals in section 
1(1) of the CAA 1964 and it was hoped by some that this would succeed in liberalising the 
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Court’s approach to these appeals,38 by the Court ordering a retrial where previously it would 
have upheld the appeal. This could be a disadvantage to the appellant if previously the 
conviction would have been quashed but now it is sent for retrial. During the debates on the 
1964 Bill it was highlighted how rare fresh evidence appeals were with Lord Parker CJ, 
whilst supporting the Bill, pointing out that the figures for 1962 showed that there were only 
four applications for the calling of fresh evidence, out of 1000 applications for leave to appeal 
against conviction, none of which was allowed.39 This small number could be explained by 
fresh evidence being hard to find but a different explanation is if appellants knew they were 
extremely unlikely to succeed they would be unlikely to appeal on the basis of fresh 
evidence even if they could find it. 
 As a result of criticisms of the working practices of the Court, the Donovan 
Committee was set up in 196540 to review its working practices, including fresh evidence 
appeals. It agreed with the various pronouncements in the judgments that the Court was not 
a court of retrial and an appeal to it ‘is not an appeal by way of a rehearing of the case.’ The 
Committee acknowledged that, if fresh evidence was admitted as a matter of course, there 
would clearly be a risk that the Court would on occasions find itself re-trying a case - ‘a 
function which Parliament did not intend it to discharge, and for which it is in any event 
inadequately equipped.’41 The Committee reported that the conditions the Court had 
imposed on the reception of fresh evidence were too narrow and the condition that had 
caused the most disquiet was the one which stated that additional evidence should not have 
been available at the original trial. The Committee recommended that additional evidence 
should be received, if it was relevant and credible and there was a reasonable explanation 
for the failure to place it before the jury.42 This condition directly related to the principle of 
finality so it is not surprising the Court took a restrictive approach given its need to ensure 
that cases should not be repeatedly reviewed and retried on appeal.43 
 The Government accepted the Committee’s recommendation but the relevant clause 
in the resulting Bill did not initially contain the words ‘there was a reasonable explanation for 
the failure to place it before the jury.’ This was because in the case of R v Kelly,44 the Court 
had taken a seemingly liberal approach to fresh evidence and it was thought that the Court 
had already adopted the recommendation of the Donovan Committee, so there was no need 
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to expressly state it in the Act. An amendment was proposed by Anthony Buck to incorporate 
these words as ‘the situation seems to be getting better,’ but the issue of non-availability of 
evidence at trial was not fully dealt with ‘save by obiter dicta.’45 There was general support 
for this amendment with various people pointing out that the appellant may be wrongly 
advised by lawyers not to include the evidence at trial.46 The Under Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, Dick Taverne, stated that the new clause was acceptable to the Lord 
Chief Justice who confirmed that it reproduced the court’s present approach but ‘if provision 
is necessary, those words seem to me to be as reasonable as one could provide. It could be 
left to the court to interpret what ‘a reasonable explanation’ was, but I would echo the hope 
of [Mr Silkin]47 that the courts will give it a liberal interpretation.’48 
 The accepted amendment was incorporated into the new fresh evidence provisions 
in section 5 of the CAA 1966: 
 
Without prejudice to the generality of s.9 of the 1907 Act, where evidence is tendered to 
the Court of Appeal under that section, the Court shall, unless they are satisfied that the 
evidence if received would not afford any ground for allowing the appeal, exercise their 
power under that section of receiving it if 
(a) it appears to them that the evidence is likely to be credible and would have been 
admissible at the trial on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and 
(b) they are satisfied that it was not adduced at the trial, but that there is a reasonable 
explanation for the failure to adduce it. 
 
The new section altered existing practice in two ways. First, it imposed a duty on the court to 
receive fresh evidence where formerly there was a discretion. Second, it need no longer be 
shown that the evidence was not available at the trial but simply that there was a reasonable 
explanation for the failure to adduce it. The clear intention of Parliament was to liberalise the 
test. 
 The provisions of the 1964 Act and the 1966 Act were consolidated in the CAA 1968 
and section 5 became section 23 of the 1968 Act. Section 23(1) consists of a general 
discretion for the Court to admit evidence ‘if they think it necessary or expedient in the 
interests of justice.’ In addition section 23(2) sets out a duty to admit evidence if certain 
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criteria of credibility, relevance, and an adequate explanation for not adducing it at the 
original trial are fulfilled. It would seem that initially the more liberal approach to fresh 
evidence promised by the Lord Chief Justice during the debates on the 1964 Act, and 
initiated in the case of R v Kelly,49 continued. In R v Harris,50 for example, the fresh evidence 
was admitted as ‘the justice of the case required that it should be heard.’ However, Edmund 
Davies LJ in R v Stafford and R v Luvaglio51 took a more cautious approach to the Court’s 
new powers when deciding whether the evidence was credible: 
 
It is clear that a more liberal attitude than hitherto prevailed was introduced by the 
provision in section 5 [of the 1966 Act] that the fresh evidence sought to be 
introduced shall be received unless the court is satisfied upon the grounds specified 
in the section that it ought to be. Nevertheless, public mischief would ensue and the 
legal process could become indefinitely prolonged were it the case that evidence 
produced at any time will generally be admitted by this Court when verdicts are being 
reviewed. There must be some curbs, the section specifies them, and we proceed to 
consider the present applications with due regard to them.52 
 
This case made it clear that the Court saw its role as reviewing verdicts, not to rehear cases 
which illustrates why fresh evidence cases are treated with such caution. This also showed 
how important the principle of finality was to judicial decision-making. After a failed attempt 
to quash the conviction at the Court of Appeal, this case eventually went to the House of 
Lords on a point of law which clarified the Court’s approach to its new fresh evidence 
powers.53 The Court rejected the previous objective test of whether the original jury might 
have been influenced by the fresh evidence and adopted a new subjective approach. The 
test to be applied was set out by Viscount Dilhorne: 
 
The court has to decide whether the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory and no 
different question has to be decided when the court allows fresh evidence to be 
called……Parliament has, in terms, said that the court should only quash a 
conviction if, there being no error of law or material irregularity at the trial, ‘they think’ 
the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactory. They have to decide and Parliament has not 
required them power to quash a verdict if they think that a jury might conceivably 
reach a different conclusion from that to which they have come. If the court has no 
reasonable doubt about the verdict, it follows that the court does not think that the 
jury could have one.54 
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The Stafford judgment has been the subject of much criticism,55 most notably from the 
former Law Lord, Lord Devlin, who criticised the approach of the judges on the grounds that 
the accused now had a mixed trial by judges and jury. He stated: 
 
They [the judges] did not hear the old witnesses and there are no specific findings 
about them to be found in the general verdict. So the judges have to decide upon 
their reliability on the record, fortified by conjectures from the verdict; to reach their 
verdict, the judges would say, the jury must have believed this or that. In assessing 
the reliability of the new witnesses…the judges are on their own. 56 
 
Lord Devlin went on to say: 
 
It seems to me that even those judges who are in favour of extending the domain of 
the judges over the facts must accept that the position which has now been reached 
is not a satisfactory one. Instead of the re-trial by jury for which Parliament provided 
in 1964, there is an imperfect re-trial by judges, in which the normal appellate review 
has been swallowed up…..I do not think that in 1964 Parliament would have taken 
kindly to a trial by judges alone in fresh evidence cases.57  
 
Lord Devlin felt that most cases involving fresh evidence should be sent for retrial before a 
fresh jury as anything less was a denial of the appellant’s constitutional right to trial by jury. 
Pattenden’s view is that Lord Devlin’s criticism is based on a crucial assumption that the 
right to trial by jury persists after a trial has already taken place; the counter view is that a 
defendant’s right to trial by jury is fully satisfied by the original trial.58  
  The Court of Appeal further clarified the operation of section 23 in the case of R v 
Lattimore and Others which was a reference by the Home Secretary.59 The issue in this case 
was the relationship between the discretionary power in section 23(1) and the duty in section 
23(2). Lord Scarman acknowledged there was confusion between the two provisions and 
explained that if the fresh evidence failed to meet the conditions in 23(2) the evidence could 
still be admitted at the discretion of the Court under 23(1). He referred to Edmund Davies 
LJ’s comment in the first Stafford and Luvaglio case that there had to be some curbs on 
section 23(1) but he did not think Edmund Davies meant that the conditions in section 23(2) 
should be imposed on section 23(1). He stated that in the exercise of section 23(1) the Court 
should have regard to the conditions but ‘Parliament by subsection (1) has placed upon the 
Court the power to do what it thinks is necessary or expedient in the interests of justice: the 
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burden of the power is heavy, but may not be off-loaded by treating the conditions specified 
in subsection (2) as decisive in the exercise of the discretion under subsection (1).’60 
 The approach taken by the House of Lords in Stafford was confirmed in 1989 by the 
Court of Appeal in one of the failed Birmingham Six appeals, R v Callaghan.61 The 
appellants had submitted that the judges should look at the case through the eyes of the jury 
and, if they were to think that the jury might have come to a different conclusion had the jury 
themselves heard the new evidence, then the appeal should be allowed regardless of what 
the judges themselves thought. The judgment of the Lord Chief Justice followed Stafford and 
rejected the earlier ‘jury impact’ test as the method for determining fresh evidence appeals: 
 
Although the Court may test its views by asking itself what the original jury might 
have concluded, the question which in the end we have to decide is whether in our 
judgment, in all the circumstances of the case including both the verdict of the jury at 
trial upon the evidence they heard, the convictions were safe and satisfactory.62 
 
The difficulty this causes is that if the Court is deciding on the basis of what it thinks of the 
evidence, this is essentially usurping the role of the jury. This moves the Court away from its 
review function towards a rehearing one; it has to make assumptions about what the jury 
thought of the evidence it heard when convicting the defendant and marry that up with the 
new evidence the Court has heard and decide whether the conviction is unsafe. This results 
in, as Lord Devlin argued, an imperfect retrial by judges. When this is combined with its 
deference to the jury and its reverence for finality, it can be difficult to overturn convictions on 
the basis of new evidence. 
 A major review of fresh evidence appeals was conducted by the Royal Commission 
on Criminal Justice (RCCJ) in 1993.63 The RCCJ concluded that the Court’s powers under 
section 23 were adequate but were perhaps being construed too narrowly. The Commission 
stated it thought it understandable that the Court would view fresh evidence with some 
suspicion and the Court was right not to wish to encourage defendants to think of the Crown 
Court trial as a ‘practice run’. On the other hand, the Court must be alive to the possibility 
that the fresh evidence may exonerate the appellant or at least throw serious doubt on the 
conviction.64 
 The Commission stated that it had been suggested in evidence to them that the 
Court took an excessively restrictive approach to whether the fresh evidence had been 
available at the trial and whether there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to 
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adduce it. It stated that ‘we would urge that in general the court should take a broad, rather 
than a narrow, approach to [fresh evidence appeals].’65. It had been suggested to the 
Commission that the test in section 23(2) that the evidence had to be ‘likely to be credible’ 
was too high a test and it recommended that the test should be changed to ‘capable of 
belief’ as this would ‘be a slightly wider formula giving the court greater scope for doing 
justice’.66  
 The Commission discussed the case of Stafford, and the criticisms of the decision by 
Lord Devlin. It agreed that there was some force in Lord Devlin’s criticisms and suggested 
that wherever possible the Court should order a retrial of the case rather than decide the 
issue for itself as ‘the Court of Appeal, which has not seen the other witnesses in the case 
nor heard their evidence, is not in our view the appropriate tribunal to assess the ultimate 
credibility and effect on a jury of the new evidence.’67  The Commission also stated that 
where a retrial was impracticable or otherwise undesirable, the Court of Appeal should follow 
the Stafford test and decide the matter for itself rather than just simply allowing the appeal.68 
This is problematic because the Court cannot consider a retrial until it has decided to quash 
the conviction and if the Court is more likely to uphold the conviction if it decides the matter 
for itself then the issue of ordering a retrial will not arise. 
These recommendations were accepted by the Government69 but the amendment to 
the Court’s fresh evidence powers was confusing as to its aims. The intention behind the 
amendment to section 23 CAA 1968 by the RCCJ was clearly to widen the basis upon which 
fresh evidence would be admitted by the Court of Appeal. This seemed to be accepted by 
the Government when introducing this part of the Criminal Appeal Bill into Parliament. The 
then Home Secretary stated that "The Bill also lowers the threshold for the admission of 
fresh evidence along the lines recommended by the Royal Commission...".70  However, 
when amendments to section 23 were introduced in the House of Lords, Baroness Blatch 
stated that her understanding from the Lord Chief Justice was that the amendments would 
not restrict fresh evidence being admitted nor change Court practice.71 Therefore, there was 
confusion as to whether these amendments were to liberalise the Court’s approach to fresh 
evidence appeals or to allow the Court to continue what it had been doing prior to the 
                                               
65
 Ibid. at ch.10, para. 56. 
66
 Ibid. at ch 10, para 60. This proposal was not new. In R v Stafford and R v Luvaglio, Edmund Davies LJ 
interpreted the phrase ‘likely to be credible’ as meaning ‘well capable of belief.’ This was following the 
interpretation in R v Parks. In R v Beresford, Sachs LJ restated the definition that credible was defined as ‘well 
capable of belief’ and approved Edmund Davies LJ’s cautious approach to the issue of credibility but also 
expanded this cautious approach to include availability as well. [1971] 56 Cr App R 143. 
67
 RCCJ, above n.1 at ch 10, para. 62. 
68
 Ibid. at ch 10 para. 63. 
69
 See Home Office (1994) Criminal Appeals and the Establishment of a Criminal Cases Review Authority: A 
Discussion Paper. 
70 
Hansard, H.C. Vol 256, Col 25, 6 March 1995. 
71 
Hansard, H.L. Vol. 565, Col 567, 26 June 1995. 
13 
 
changes in the law. This was a reference to the supposed liberal approach the Court was 
taking prior to the CAA 1995 under the stewardship of Lord Chief Justice Taylor.72 This was 
the same argument during the debates on the 1966 CAA that the Court was taking a liberal 
approach prior to the legislative changes. 
 The amendments to the fresh evidence provisions are in section four of the CAA 
1995 which amended the provisions in section 23 of the 1968 Act. The amendments to 
section 23 were that the duty to admit new evidence was abolished, but the power to admit 
new evidence is made subject to a duty to consider the same factors as limited the former 
duty: credibility, relevance to the safety of the conviction, admissibility at trial and the 
reasonableness of the explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence at trial. Following 
the recommendation of the RCCJ, the requirement that new evidence be ‘likely to be 
credible’ had now become ‘capable of belief.’ As under the previous legislation, the Court’s 
power to receive evidence is unfettered, provided it considers it necessary or expedient in 
the interests of justice to do so, regardless of the above factors. The Court’s rarely used 
power to rehear the evidence presented at the trial was abolished.73 The removal of the 
Court’s power to rehear trial evidence reinforces the review function which arguably is what 
has caused some of the problems in the first place.  
The key to the liberalisation of the Court’s approach would be whether the overriding 
consideration is if it is in the interests of justice to admit the evidence regardless of whether 
the four factors have been satisfied. The restrictive approach of the Court can be 
demonstrated by undue weight being given to any of the four factors in the face of evidence 
which may lead to the conviction being unsafe. This was expressed by JUSTICE in their 
response to the RCCJ report: 
 
There is clearly a consensus that what is considered as fresh evidence should no 
longer be subject to the restrictive approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in the 
past. Our view is that although the Court is entitled to seek and take account of any 
explanation why evidence which was available was not adduced at the trial, this 
should not be the determining factor; the test must be a broad one of whether the 
evidence goes to the safety of the conviction.74  
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In the more recent judgment of R v Erskine,75 the Lord Justice CJ has sought to clarify the 
operation of section 23: 
 
Virtually by definition, the decision whether to admit fresh evidence is case and fact 
specific. The discretion to receive fresh evidence is a wide one focussing on the 
interests of justice. The considerations listed in subsection (2)(a) to (d) are neither 
exhaustive nor conclusive, but they require specific attention. The fact that the issue 
to which the fresh evidence relates was not raised at trial does not automatically 
preclude its reception. However it is well understood that, save exceptionally, if the 
defendant is allowed to advance on appeal a defence and/or evidence which could 
and should have been but were not put before the jury, our trial process would be 
subverted. Therefore if they were not deployed when they were available to be 
deployed, or the issues could have been but were not raised at trial, it is clear from 
the statutory structure, as explained in the authorities, that unless a reasonable and 
persuasive explanation for one or other of these omissions is offered, it is highly 
unlikely that the “interests of justice” test will be satisfied.’76 
 
 
How this works in practice will be discussed using empirical research below. A major 
development in recent years which may have had an impact on the working practices of the 
Court in fresh evidence appeals is the case of R v Pendleton77 and it is necessary to outline 
the development of this judgment before discussing the empirical research. 
 
Pendleton and the Court’s decision-making process 
As discussed above, initially the Court applied the objective jury impact test in determining 
the appeal but the House of Lords in Stafford decided the test should be more subjective. 
The case of R v Pendleton gave the House of Lords the opportunity to review the Stafford 
judgment. The Crown relied on the decision in Stafford while the appellants relied on the 
judgment of R v McNamee78 where Swinton Thomas LJ had applied the jury impact test: 
 
We have…..concluded that the conviction is unsafe because we cannot be sure that 
the jury would have reached the same conclusion that they were sure of guilt if they 
had the fresh evidence we have heard. Furthermore the case as presented to us by 
both sides is very different to that presented at trial. 
 
The leading speech in Pendleton was given by Lord Bingham who discussed the difficulties 
of the Court’s task in relation to fresh evidence appeals as: 
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…it will ordinarily be safe for the Court of Appeal to infer that the factual ingredients 
essential to prove guilt have been established against the satisfaction of the jury. But 
the Court of Appeal can rarely ever know, save perhaps from questions asked by the 
jury after retirement, at what points the jury have felt difficulty. The jury’s process of 
reasoning will not be revealed and, if a number of witnesses give evidence bearing 
on a single question, the Court of Appeal will never know which of those witnesses 
the jury accepted and which, if any, they doubted or rejected.79  
 
Lord Bingham accepted the appellant’s submission that the starting point had to be 
recognition of the jury as the tribunal of fact but he was not persuaded that the House of 
Lords had laid down any incorrect principle in Stafford, ‘so long as the Court of Appeal bears 
very clearly in mind that the question for its consideration is whether the conviction is safe 
and not whether the accused is guilty.’80 Therefore: 
 
The Court of Appeal can make its assessment of the fresh evidence it has heard, but 
save in a clear case it is at a disadvantage in seeking to relate that evidence to the 
rest of the evidence which the jury heard. For these reasons it will usually be wise for 
the Court of Appeal, in a case of any difficulty, to test their own provisional view by 
asking whether the evidence, if given at the trial, might reasonably have affected the 
decision of the trial jury to convict. If it might, the conviction must be thought to be 
unsafe.81 
 
Donald Pendleton’s appeal was allowed on the basis that the Court of Appeal had failed to 
appreciate that the importance of the fresh evidence was such that it would have led to the 
trial being conducted completely differently: 
 
Had the jury been trying a different case on substantially different evidence the 
outcome must be in doubt. In holding otherwise the Court of Appeal strayed beyond 
its true function of review and made findings that were not open to it in all the 
circumstances. Indeed it came perilously close to considering whether the appellant, 
in its judgment, was guilty.82  
 
Lords Steyn and Hope agreed with Lord Bingham’s reasoning but Lord Hobhouse took a 
differing view, though agreeing that the conviction should be quashed. He felt that changing 
the test to ‘unsafe’ had reinforced the reasoning in Stafford that ‘appeals are not to be 
allowed unless the Court of Appeal has itself made the requisite assessment’83 as: 
 
in my judgment it is not right to attempt to look into the minds of the members of the 
jury. Their deliberations are secret and their precise and detailed reasoning is not 
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known. For an appellate court to speculate, whether hypothetically or actually, is not 
appropriate. It is for the Court of Appeal to answer the direct and simply stated 
question: Do we think that the conviction was unsafe?84 
 
Pendleton failed to bring clarity. The question after Pendleton was what approach the Court 
of Appeal would follow in fresh evidence appeals; would it be Lord Bingham’s supposedly 
more liberal approach in highlighting the jury impact test or Lord Hobhouse’s reinforcement 
of the supposedly more restrictive Stafford approach?  
The Stafford approach 
The reinforcement of the Stafford approach of Lord Hobhouse is illustrated by cases such as 
R v Hanratty,85 R v Akiner,86 R v Izzigil,87 R v JB,88 R v Hakala,89 and R v Cleeland90 where 
the Court appeared to make its own evaluation of the fresh evidence and upheld the 
appeals. In R v Hakala, one of the reasons given for the reinforcement of the Stafford 
approach was that:  
The judgment in “fresh evidence” cases will inevitably therefore continue to focus on 
the facts before the trial jury, in order to ensure that the right question – the safety, or 
otherwise, of the conviction - is answered. It is integral to the process that if the fresh 
evidence is disputed, this court must decide whether and to what extent it should be 
accepted or rejected, and if it is to be accepted, to evaluate its importance, or 
otherwise, relative to the remaining material which was before the trial jury: hence the 
jury impact test. Indeed, although the question did not arise in Pendleton, the fresh 
evidence adduced by the appellant, or indeed the Crown, may serve to confirm rather 
than undermine the safety of the conviction. Unless this evaluation is carried out, it is 
difficult to see how this court can perform out its statutory responsibility in a fresh 
evidence case, and exercise its “power of review to guard against the possibility of 
injustice”. However the safety of the appellant's convictions is examined, the 
essential question, and ultimately the only question for this court, is whether, in the 
light of the fresh evidence, the convictions are unsafe.91  
 
The Stafford approach was reinforced in the judgment of R v Ahmed.92 In that case, Mantell 
LJ referred to the case of R v Hakala and also R v Hanratty which had both approved 
Stafford and cited with approval the speech from Judge LJ in R v Hakala above. He stated  
 
as is shown in Pendleton and Hakala it is for this Court to decide whether or not the 
evidence should be accepted. If it is accepted, the question is then as to its impact on 
the safety of the conviction.93  
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The Privy Council had the opportunity to review R v Pendleton in Dial and Dottin v The 
State.94 This was a death row case from Trinidad and Tobago. There was undisputed 
information that an identification witness had lied at trial. The majority (three-two) dismissed 
the appeal and Lord Bingham was in the majority. Lord Brown outlined the approach to use 
when determining fresh evidence appeals. He stated: 
 
In the Board's view the law is now clearly established and can be simply stated as 
follows. Where fresh evidence is adduced on a criminal appeal it is for the Court of 
Appeal, assuming always that it accepts it, to evaluate its importance in the context 
of the remainder of the evidence in the case. If the court concludes that the fresh 
evidence raises no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused it will dismiss the 
appeal. The primary question is for the court itself, and is not what effect the fresh 
evidence would have had on the mind of the jury. That said, if the court regards the 
case as a difficult one, it may find it helpful to test its view 'by asking whether the 
evidence, if given at the trial, might reasonably have affected the decision of the trial 
jury to convict' (Pendleton at p 83, para [19]). The guiding principle nevertheless 
remains that stated by Viscount Dilhorne in Stafford (at p 906) and affirmed by the 
House in Pendleton: 
 
While … the Court of Appeal and this House may find it a convenient approach to 
consider what a jury might have done if they had heard the fresh evidence, the 
ultimate responsibility rests with them and them alone for deciding the question 
[whether or not the verdict is unsafe].95  
 
It is not clear from this whether Lord Bingham was now retreating from his views in 
Pendleton and following Lord Hobhouse’s line of reasoning in Pendleton which reinforced 
Stafford. There were two dissenting judgments from Lords Steyn and Hutton which appeared 
to emphasise the jury impact test of Pendleton. 
            In R v. Dunn & ors,96 Goldring LJ explained the differences between Pendleton and 
Dial as a difference in ‘emphasis.’  These cases were discussed in R v Burridge.97 In this 
case, counsel for the appellant had argued that ‘Dial weakened the rigour of the test 
identified in Pendleton as exemplified by the fact that Lord Steyn (who had been party to the 
decision in Pendleton) dissented’98 in Dial.  Leveson LJ rejected this and stated: 
Furthermore, as to the principle, it is important to underline that Lord Bingham was 
part of the majority judgment articulated by Lord Brown and would hardly have been 
so had he considered that the analysis of Pendleton and the subsequent decisions 
was not both accurately reflected and fairly illuminated by Lord Brown’s exposition of 
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the law.  We have no doubt that it was: both in Stafford v DPP and Pendleton, the 
House of Lords rejected the proposition that the jury impact test was determinative, 
explaining that it was  only a mechanism in a difficult case for the Court of Appeal to 
“test its view” as to the safety of a conviction.99   
 
More recently in R v Ahmed (Mushtaq),100 Hughes LJVP stated (citing Pendleton): 
 
The responsibility for deciding whether fresh material renders a conviction unsafe is 
laid inescapably on this court, which must make up its own mind. Of course it must 
consider the nature of the issue before the jury and such information as it can gather 
as to the reasoning process through which the jury will have been passing. It is likely 
to ask itself by way of check what impact the fresh material might have had on the 
jury. But in most cases of arguably relevant fresh evidence it will be impossible to be 
100% sure that it might not possibly have had some impact on the jury's 
deliberations, since ex hypothesi the jury has not seen the fresh material. The 
question which matters is whether the fresh material causes this court to doubt the 
safety of the verdict of guilty…….. Where fresh evidence is under consideration the 
primary question "is for the court itself and is not what effect the fresh evidence 
would have had on the mind of the jury." (Dial). Both in Stafford v DPP [1974] AC 878 
at 906 and in Pendleton the House of Lords rejected the proposition that the jury 
impact test was determinative, explaining that it was only a mechanism in a difficult 
case for the Court of Appeal to "test its view" as to the safety of a conviction. Lord 
Bingham, who gave the leading speech in Pendleton, was a party to Dial.101 
 
In R v O’Donnell,102 the CCRC had referred a case on the basis that the new material 
submitted might have affected the jury’s verdict. Hughes LJ rejected this saying: 
 
This is not the acid test on appeal but only an advisable cross-check as explained 
in Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66; [2002] 1 Cr App R 34. The responsibility, in a fresh 
evidence case, for deciding whether the conviction is safe or not is inescapably laid 
on this court. Both in Stafford v DPP [1974] AC 878 at 906 and in Pendleton the 
House of Lords rejected the proposition that the jury impact test is determinative. It 
cannot be because it will rarely be possible to be 100% sure that fresh 
evidence could not have affected the jury's deliberations, since ex hypothesi it did not 
see it.103 
 
This Stafford approach has been approved more recently in R v Noye;104 R 
v. O'Meally;105 and R v. Edward Brown.106  This may seem to be the prevailing approach, but 
despite these authorities, the jury impact test is still being used in some cases.  
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Jury impact test 
There are a number of cases where the Court used the jury impact test to quash the 
conviction.107 The Court’s consistent claim that it decides whether the conviction is unsafe 
and not whether the appellant is guilty gives rise to a number of judgments where the Court 
says it cannot speculate on the decision-making process of the jury at trial. It then appears to 
do just that when deciding that the new evidence may have had an impact on their decision 
at trial. It is not entirely clear how the Court is able to decide whether the fresh evidence may 
have had an impact on the jury without trying to ascertain why they made the decisions they 
did with the evidence they heard and how this new evidence would have influenced that 
decision. A useful case in this respect is R v A,108 where the appellant was convicted of rape 
and the fresh evidence the Court heard was three witnesses casting doubt on the 
complainant’s story. Counsel for the prosecution then sought leave to call the complainant 
and the Court refused with Laws LJ stating: 
 
We acknowledge that there are cases in which the court has received evidence 
adduced by the Crown to rebut fresh evidence called for an appellant. They include 
instances where objective scientific material is available which refutes the new 
testimony, or may do so. This case is in a different category. We would have been 
invited to measure the complainant's credibility against that of the new witnesses for 
the appellant. That is very close to the trial process itself, given the nature of the 
three issues in the appeal and the fact that the complainant's credibility was at the 
heart of the case. We should be trespassing onto the proper territory of the jury. In 
those circumstances we declined, as we have said, to receive evidence from the 
complainant.109 
 
The Court quashed the conviction seemingly accepting that the evidence from the witnesses 
showed the complainant had admitted to lying. It is difficult to see how this is not the Court 
usurping the role of the jury. 
            There are also examples of the jury impact test being used to uphold the appeal.110 
These cases show that the jury impact test is as capable of resulting in convictions being 
upheld as it is in them being quashed. Although the general view is that the jury impact test 
is preferable because the Court deciding the issue for itself is more likely to lead to a 
usurping of the role of the jury which it does not like to do, these cases appear to be 
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weighing up what the jury would or would not make of the evidence beyond all reasonable 
doubt so it is not overly clear what the differences are between the approaches. When 
determining if the conviction is unsafe, the Court must be deciding if the new evidence raises 
a reasonable doubt about guilt. If this is the decision-making process, then the Court is 
usurping the jury’s role when deciding whether the conviction is unsafe based on new 
evidence. This is to some extent inevitable in these appeals as the Court is deciding on 
evidence that was never before the jury. The Court is unable to order a retrial until it has 
quashed the conviction so it still has to choose which approach to take if it wishes to order a 
retrial. The findings from the empirical evidence will now be discussed. 
 
Empirical research 
As the previous discussion shows, the Court's approach to these appeals has largely been 
described as restrictive, though it has occasionally been acknowledged as taking a more 
liberal approach. The difficulty is that without a normative baseline with which to measure the 
Court's approach it can be difficult to determine whether the Court is taking a restrictive or a 
liberal approach. With that in mind, the judgments in this article are analysed in terms of 
whether it is possible to indicate whether the Court is being restrictive or liberal. Before the 
current sample of judgments is discussed, it is necessary to outline the quantitative findings 
from the last major empirical study on fresh evidence appeals to place the current sample in 
context. Research was conducted by Kate Malleson for the RCCJ and the data used as the 
principal basis for that study is that derived from published and unpublished Court of Appeal 
judgments.111 Malleson reviewed the first 300 appeals against conviction of 1990, analysing 
each judgment separately to gather information on the grounds of appeal, the approach of 
the Court to the case, and the result of the appeal. Where the Court commented on relevant 
issues such as fresh evidence these were recorded in order to obtain both qualitative and 
quantitative information on the Court’s powers and practices.  
The research for this article was conducted replicating the Malleson study in order to 
try to assess whether the changes in the CAA 1995 and the case of R v Pendleton had 
made any difference.112 This study reports on findings from a relational content analysis of 
the first 300 available appeals against conviction which the Court considered in 2016. The 
transcripts of the appeals were taken from Casetrack.113 Some of the transcripts on the 
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database were not available as they were subject to reporting restrictions so where this 
occurred the next transcript was accessed.114 The appeals reviewed covered the period from 
January to July 2016. The same methodology as Malleson was adopted in order to provide a 
comparison. 
 This study has not sought to determine in any reliable statistical terms, whether the 
CAA 1995 had changed the way in which the Court makes its decision as compared with 
Malleson’s findings in 1990.  In order to make such claims, the research would have had to 
have been constructed in a way that would permit a more sophisticated analysis including 
the use of multiple regression tests.  This form of analysis would have assisted in 
determining whether other intervening factors between the two studies, such as the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act, a change in political climate, or a change in senior 
judges, may have had a greater effect of any perceptible change in Court of Appeal decision 
making, than the introduction of the CAA 1995. This study does provide an indication of the 
ways in which the Court’s decision making has changed since the introduction of the CAA 
1995 and may serve as a basis for future quantitative analysis that attempts to verify or 
reject these tentative hypotheses.  
 
The 1990 and 2016 samples of judgments 
Malleson had a total of twenty-three cases in her sample in which fresh evidence was raised 
(eight per cent of the total appeals). Four out of the twenty-three cases involved expert or 
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 The cases subject to reporting restrictions tend to be those where children are involved but there is no 
information on them on Casetrack so it is impossible to give any details of what they are. They will include 
sentence appeals, appeals against conviction and renewed applications to appeal. 
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Table 1.1: Type of fresh evidence cases before the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
January to July 1990 
 
Type of Fresh Evidence  Allowed     Dismissed/            Adjourned/      %                
                       Refused              Retrial115       of total 
 
New witness of fact                 2           7                1               44% 
Trial witness of fact                 1           4                1               26% 
New expert witness                 0           1                2              13% 
Trial expert witness                 0           1                0                4% 
Other                   1           2                0              13% 
 
TOTAL (N= 23)      4             15    4              100% 
 
 
In fourteen of the twenty-three cases the evidence was admitted by the Court (sixty-one per 
cent). Of these, Malleson states four were allowed and two were adjourned for a full hearing 
(being renewed applications). In two cases retrials were ordered. Therefore, Malleson states 
that ‘the number of appeals which succeeded on the basis of fresh evidence was small, 
being less than seventeen per cent of the total fresh evidence cases and just over one per 
cent of all the cases reviewed.’116 These figures are based on the number of appeals 
allowed without a retrial. Malleson’s findings will now be compared with the 2016 sample of 
judgments. 
In 2016, there were a total of forty-two cases in the sample in which fresh evidence 
was raised (fourteen per cent of the total appeals). Seven out of the forty-two cases involved 
expert or forensic evidence and fourteen involved witnesses of fact with twenty-one in the 
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 The fresh evidence in the retrials cases was new expert evidence and a trial witness of fact claiming to have 
wrongly identified the appellant. The fresh evidence in the cases adjourned was a new witness of fact and new 
expert evidence. 
116
 Malleson, above n. 8 at 9. 
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Table 1.2: Type of fresh evidence cases before the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
January to July 2016 
 
 
Type of Fresh Evidence  Allowed          Dismissed/        Adjourned/               %                 
                       Refused          Retrial                 of total 
 
New witness of fact                 0       8                        1                   19% 
Trial witness of fact                 0                        5                       0                     14% 
New expert witness                 1                        5                       0                     14% 
Trial expert witness                 0                        0                       1                      3% 
Other                   0                       21                      0                     50% 
 
TOTAL (N = 42)                 1                       39                      2                     100% 
 
 
The first thing to note is that there were far more appeals based on fresh evidence in 2016 
than in 1990 with twenty-three in 1990 and forty-two in 2016. This is potentially evidence of a 
more liberal approach in 2016 as it could be suggested a greater number of fresh evidence 
appeals are getting through the leave filter. However, the majority of fresh evidence appeals 
in the 2016 sample were renewed applications to appeal having initially being rejected by the 
single judge and therefore, were still seeking leave to appeal.117 The evidence was admitted 
by the Court in eight of the forty-two cases (nineteen per cent) in 2016 which is significantly 
lower than sixty-one per cent in 1990. This is potentially evidence that the Court is now more 
restrictive than it was in 1990 and twenty of the appeals in 2016 were non-counsel 
applications and in many of those the applicant had drafted his/her own grounds of appeal. 
Malleson conducted a separate study on counsel and non-counsel appeals and her 
conclusions were that counsel-renewed applications had a substantially higher success rate 
than non-counsel applications which may account for the low figure of fresh evidence 
admitted.118   
 Of the eight appeals where the fresh evidence was admitted in 2016, one was 
allowed and seven were dismissed. In two cases, a retrial was ordered. Therefore, the 
number of appeals which succeeded on the basis of fresh evidence in 2016 was very small 
being two per cent of the total fresh evidence cases and 0.3 per cent of all 300 cases 
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 Malleson only makes reference to two of her sample being renewed applications to appeal so if this is the 
case there was a significant increase in these appeals in the 2016 sample. 
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 Above n.8 at 35. 
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reviewed. These figures are based on the one appeal allowed. The two per cent figure in 
2016 is obviously much lower than seventeen per cent in 1990 which is possibly evidence of 
the Court’s restrictive approach as fresh evidence was admitted in a higher number of 
appeals in 1990. The larger number of appeals based on fresh evidence in 2016 may be 
evidence that more fresh evidence is now being brought to the Court which is beneficial but 
the success rate of one per cent of all cases reviewed in 1990 and 0.3 per cent in 2016 
shows that fresh evidence appeals remain very rare and the chances of success are rarer 
still.119  
 If the cases where a retrial was ordered are included in the ‘success’ rate then the 
figures are slightly improved. Malleson had two retrials ordered so if these were added to the 
four appeals allowed without retrials then the number of appeals succeeding (six) on the 
basis of fresh evidence in 1990 was twenty-six per cent which is a slight improvement on 
seventeen percent which is the success rate without retrials included. This represents two 
per cent of all the appeals in the 1990 sample. There were two retrials ordered in the 2016 
sample so if these were added to the one appeal allowed without a retrial then the number of 
appeals succeeding (three) on the basis of fresh evidence in 2016 was seven per cent which 
is a slight improvement on two per cent which is the success rate without retrials included. 
This represents one per cent of all the appeals in the 2016 sample. A retrial cannot be 
ordered unless the appeal is quashed first so the ordering of a retrial is at least 
acknowledgement that the appellant has succeeded in the very difficult task of overturning 
the conviction. Including retrials in the success rate does show a slight improvement in the 
figures but the comparisons between the two samples still show that the chances of success 
in 2016 were significantly lower than they were in 1990 and the chances of success remain 
very rare in fresh evidence appeals however they are measured. 
 In 1990, four out of the twenty-three cases involved expert or forensic evidence and 
sixteen involved witnesses of fact, with two in the ‘the other’ category. In 2016, seven out of 
the forty-three cases involved expert or forensic evidence and fourteen involved witnesses of 
fact with 21 in the ‘other’ category.120 The first two categories are obviously very similar with 
the major difference being two in the ‘other’ category in 1990 and 21 in the ‘other’ category in 
2016. The large rise in the ‘other’ category can partly be explained by the large number of 
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 These figures are taken from the sample of judgments that were available on Casetrack. Casetrack held both 
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120
 This category includes appeals where the fresh evidence was not actually stated; R v Patel [2016] EWCA 
Crim 453; R v Shaikh [2016] EWCA Crim 504; R v Otti [2016] EWCA Crim 865; R v Moate [2016] EWCA 
Crim 350; R v Dcruze [2016] EWCA Crim 308. 
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non-counsel appeals. If the applicant has drafted his/her own grounds they are not easily 
categorised as they tend to be specific to the individual case and therefore, the Court may 
have difficulty understanding what the fresh evidence is and whether it has made the 
conviction unsafe which is why counsel appeals have a much higher chance of success.  It 
would seem that the rise in non-counsel applications is inevitable given the recent cuts in 
legal aid121 which is detrimental to the applicant because he/she is more likely to be 
unsuccessful and also for the Court because the hearings take longer which has an impact 
on waiting times and the backlog of cases waiting to be heard. In the latest Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division) Annual report 2015-2016 the Registrar of Criminal Appeals stated: 
 
Applications for leave to appeal lodged by applicants acting in person have increased 
markedly this year and now stand at approximately 9.21%. Those numbers are now 
very significant and it looks as if the percentage will be over 10% next year. There is 
a price to be paid for this because the case management of cases place a much 
greater demand on the resources of my Office, in terms both of advice to applicants 
and support to the judiciary.122 
 
As a result of the rise in non-counsel applications, the Court has introduced a new procedure 
whereby all grounds by applicants in person are reviewed by lawyers and a summary 
prepared before the permission stage to ensure that genuine grounds are identified at an 
early stage.123 
 Fresh evidence appeals are the most problematic for lawyers because it may take 
years to find new evidence and, as this and other research shows, it is very difficult to 
succeed with these appeals. It is even more difficult to succeed if the applicant is drafting 
his/her own grounds and the increase in these appeals is a worrying development, 
particularly if innocent people are languishing in prison because they are unable to get legal 
representation and navigate the difficulties of the appellate process.124 
 
Qualitative findings 
The qualitative findings fall into three categories in the 2016 sample, first, the decisions that 
referred to section 23 CAA 1968 directly when deciding the appeal, second, those who do 
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 See, for example, O. Bowcott, ‘Legal aid cuts: lawyers to begin boycott that could see courts grind to a halt’ 
The Guardian, 30 June 2015. Available at  
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/jun/30/criminal-lawyers-promise-boycott-legal-aid-cases-lower-rate 
(last accessed 20 February 2017).  
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not refer to it directly but use the terminology from it, and third, those who do not refer to it at 
all. These approaches are discussed in turn.  
 There were sixteen cases in the sample where section 23 was directly mentioned. 
Three of these were allowed and there were two retrials ordered. Of those allowed, in R v 
IB,125 post-trial forensic testing had been done on the complainant’s underwear which 
revealed more than one DNA profile. The Court considered the factors in section 23(2) and 
in particular whether the new evidence afforded any ground for allowing the appeal. The 
Court admitted the evidence and quashed the conviction due to the doubts it raised about 
the safety of the conviction. In the controversial case of R v Evans,126 the fresh evidence was 
a post-trial witness who had had a previous relationship with the complainant.127 This was a 
referral by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. The new evidence was heard ‘de bene 
esse’128 where the Court hears the evidence without considering section 23 first. This is a 
more liberal approach because the Court does at least hear the evidence before making a 
judgment on it whereas the Court may use section 23 to reject the evidence without hearing 
it. The Court concluded that all four conditions in section 23(2) had been satisfied, admitted 
the evidence, quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial.129  The Court appeared to be 
taking a very proactive approach in R v Chitolie130 where the applicant had drafted his own 
grounds of appeal and wished to represent himself in Court. The Registrar of Criminal 
Appeals had been concerned about this because it was felt there was evidence that the 
applicant had a mental illness and therefore, should have been judged unfit to plead at trial. 
The applicant refused to accept that he had a mental illness but the single judge referred it to 
the full Court to consider this with fresh evidence from a consultant psychiatrist. The Court 
rejected the applicant’s own grounds but admitted the evidence of the psychiatrist under 
section 23 and quashed the conviction substituting a finding of unfit to plead under section 
6(2) CAA 1968. This would not have happened without the interventionist approach of the 
Registrar, the single judge in giving leave and the full Court hearing the appeal. 
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 [2016] EWCA Crim 1758. 
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 [2016] EWCA Crim 452. Ched Evans was a professional football player and the case had attracted a large 
amount of publicity. The case was sent for retrial and he was acquitted. 
See https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/oct/14/footballer-ched-evans-cleared-of-in-retrial (last accessed 
20 February 2017). 
127This was problematic because it related to the complainant’s sexual behavior and therefore there had to be a 
consideration of section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
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 The important recent case of R v Cross [2014] EWCA Crim 96 was mentioned where the Lord Chief Justice 
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argument, then considered whether it should be admitted. The Court emphasised that the decision about whether 
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hearing or the single judge determining leave to appeal. 
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 The most common reason for rejecting the fresh evidence under section 23 was 
because the evidence was available at trial and there was no reasonable explanation as to 
why it was not used.131 In the other cases, the reasons for rejection were more varied in 
relation to section 23. In R v Marcantonio,132 evidence of psychiatrists was admitted under 
section 23 but the Court dismissed the appeal because the evidence did not show the 
appellant was unfit to plead at trial. In R v Newman,133 the evidence of a new witness of fact 
was rejected because it was not capable of belief. In R v Scholey,134 expert evidence of a 
head injury was rejected because it did not satisfy any of the elements in section 23(2). In R 
v Prince,135 a statement from a co-defendant was rejected because it did not satisfy section 
23(2). In R v Malik,136 fresh evidence of threats by the co-accused was rejected because it 
did not satisfy section 23 without explaining why. In R v Ebanks,137 various pieces of 
evidence such as e-mails, a passport and a lease were rejected because they would not 
afford any ground for allowing the appeal. In R v Hindocha,138 the fresh evidence of 
statements relating to the honesty of the applicant was rejected because it was available at 
trial and did not afford a ground for allowing the appeal. In R v Onukafor,139 documents from 
a Building Society were rejected because they would not have assisted the applicant. 
 There were eleven judgments in the sample where the terminology of section 23 was 
used without reference to the statute itself. The most common reason to reject evidence 
again was effectively section 23(2)(d) where the Court considered there was not a 
reasonable explanation for not adducing it at the original trial.140  In the other two cases, the 
evidence was rejected because it did not afford any ground for allowing the appeal.141  
 It is clear from reading these judgments where section 23 is directly or indirectly 
referred to that the judges are aware that any evidence may be admitted under section 23(1) 
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28 
 
if it is in the interests of justice to do so. This effectively allows them to admit any evidence 
they wish without consideration of the conditions imposed by section 23(2). It would appear 
however, that the judges are reluctant to do this and more likely to apply the conditions in 
section 23(2) to determine the outcome. So although they do not have to consider the 
conditions in section 23(2), they seem more likely to do this rather than any broader 
considerations of what is in the interests of justice. The best example of this is R v Osmani142 
where counsel for the applicant argued that the interests of justice test (section 23(1)) should 
be the one for the Court to follow and, even if the evidence could have been available at trial, 
it still should prevail under section 23(1). In R v IB,143 the Court stated ‘our first task is 
obviously, in considering whether to receive any evidence of such matters, to pay particular 
regard to those factors provided in section 23(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.’144 
Similarly, in R v Reid,145 the Court stated ‘in the case of the evidence of the new witness we 
ask ourselves, in accordance with section 23(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, if it is 
necessary or expedient in the interests of justice to receive such evidence……..In doing so 
we take into account the criteria in section 23(2).’146 In R v Scholey,147 the Court stated ‘in 
our view, [the expert’s] report does not satisfy the requirements of section 23 of the 1968 
Act.  By reference to subsection (2) we do not think that the part of the report upon which 
[defence counsel] relies is capable of belief’.148 In R v Prince,149 the Court stated ‘in our 
judgment the proposed evidence does not come within the criteria set out at section 23(2) of 
the 1968 Act for it to be received.’150 It would seem therefore, that the judiciary are applying 
section 23(1) restrictively by imposing the conditions in s.23(2) on s.23(1) when s.23(1) 
contains a much broader discretion to admit evidence. 
 It would also appear from these judgments that the condition in section 23(2) which 
causes the most difficulty is section 23(2)(d) and the reasonable explanation for not 
adducing the evidence at trial. The Court is reluctant to admit any evidence available at trial 
and its attitude is one of suspicion if it was available but not used with mention of ‘tactical 
games’ in the judgments.151 This is harsh on the applicant if his/her own lawyers made an 
error but it is not surprising given the Court’s reverence for the principle of finality, and its 
review function which hamper its ability to investigate and rectify errors of fact.  
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There were fifteen cases in the sample where neither section 23 nor the wording of 
section 23 was used to determine the appeal. Ten of these cases were non-counsel grounds 
and therefore it was understandable if the applicant was not using this terminology when 
drafting his/her own grounds, though the judges should be familiar with this terminology. The 
main reasons for rejection in these cases were that the evidence was not fresh; there was no 
merit in it; it was not relevant to anything, or it was unclear what the appellant was referring 
to.152 These cases highlight the importance of having legal representation because they can 
be difficult to understand and are dealt with very briefly by the Court compared to those with 
legal representation, though having legal representation does not always assist the appellant 
as the interesting case of R v Aboulkadir,153 shows. This case was a referral from the CCRC. 
Aboulkadir was convicted of sexual offences and his defence was that he had never had any 
sexual activity with the complainant. The CCRC had obtained fresh expert scientific 
evidence which showed that the appellant had indeed had sexual activity with the 
complainant. The appellant’s lawyer had been instructed by his client to maintain that he had 
not had sexual activity at the appeal and the CCRC had referred on the basis that he did 
have sexual activity with her but the issue now was one of consent. The Court of Appeal was 
clearly perplexed at the appeal being run on a different factual basis to what had been run at 
trial and the opposing arguments of the appellant’s lawyer and the CCRC. It was therefore 
understandable that the Court would uphold the conviction with DNA evidence showing the 
appellant was lying. A novel CCRC referral was R v Charlton and R v Ali,154 where the 
CCRC argued that because of the wrongful conviction cases of R v O’Brien and others155 
and R v Paris, Abdullahi and Miller,156 which were largely attributed to police malpractice, the 
convictions of Charlton and Ali were unsafe because the same police officers had 
investigated their cases. This was a novel approach because the appeal Court did not view 
this evidence as coming within the usual definitions of ‘fresh evidence’ and section 23 was 
not referred to in the case. The appeal was upheld because the Court felt there was 
evidence linking them to the crime. 
In terms of the Court’s decision-making process, the majority of the appeals were 
renewed applications to appeal and therefore the Court itself was making the determination 
of whether the evidence should be admitted as that is its task on these applications. This is 
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illustrated by Jackson LJ in R v Newman,157 ‘the proposed fresh evidence is incapable of 
belief. In those circumstances we do not need to go into the more difficult issue of the effect 
of that evidence, if accepted, upon the safety of the conviction.’158 However, in R v Moate,159 
and R v Robinson,160 the Court stated that it had considered whether the conviction was 
unsafe as part of deciding whether the evidence should be admitted. In R v Pratt,161 the 
Court seemed to suggest that the Court should consider unsafety when determining whether 
to admit the evidence. Haddon-Cave LJ stated,  
 
This court must be satisfied as to two matters when considering fresh evidence 
applications such as this: first, that the party seeking to adduce the fresh evidence 
can demonstrate a reasonable excuse as to why such evidence was not put before 
the court below; second, that the fresh evidence is likely to result in a materially 
different outcome.162  
 
It is not clear from this what a ‘materially different outcome’ means other than the conviction 
being unsafe. In the six full appeals against conviction, the Court decided the issue for itself 
with no mention of Pendleton in three appeals.163 Pendleton was referred to in the other 
three appeals, in R v Charlton and R v Ali,164 the Court referred to Mushtaq Ahmed,165 and 
decided the convictions were not unsafe. In R v Evans,166 Hallett LJ stated: 
 
If the court was persuaded to receive the evidence we were invited to find that had it 
been given at trial it might reasonably have affected the decision of the jury to 
convict: R v Pendleton [2002] 1 Cr. App. R. 34 HL. It should therefore have a 
significant impact on the members of this court.167  
 
The Court went on to quash the conviction with no reference to the jury so using the Stafford 
approach. A much larger sample of fresh evidence appeals would be required to determine 
how Pendleton works in practice and whether the jury impact test does provide a more 
liberal approach to determining the appeal. 
 
Conclusion 
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It is difficult not to come to the same conclusion that Kate Malleson did twenty-seven years 
ago: 
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative data show that fresh evidence cases 
are rare and treated with great caution by the Court. Only in very limited 
circumstances will such evidence be admitted and if admitted, form the basis of a 
successful appeal. Moreover, the Court rarely sets out the reasoning behind its 
decisions about fresh evidence so that it is hard to discern in any detail what the 
Court’s approach is to this category of appeal.168  
 
The rise in the number of fresh evidence appeals in 2016 may be evidence of a more liberal 
approach but the majority of these were renewed applications to appeal and this is easily 
explained by the rise of these generally as stated in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
Annual Report mentioned above. The Court’s approach still appears to be driven by its 
deference to the jury verdict and its reverence for the principle of finality. Even the most 
ardent miscarriages of justice campaigners have recognised the need for finality in the 
criminal justice process. For example, the campaigning journalist Bob Woffenden recognises 
the need for finality to avoid criminal justice deteriorating into a process in which repeated 
tribunals reassess the same issues which he admits would be ‘self-defeating, impractical, 
and also absurdly expensive.’169 He accepts the fear that an appellate body that failed to 
place restrictions on the cases it was willing to reassess would be overwhelmed. He also 
sees the danger that defence lawyers would treat a trial as a mere rehearsal of their ‘full’ 
case. But he then goes on to say that it is ‘nevertheless unpardonable that appeal judges 
have allowed such considerations an overriding importance, with the result that the channels 
of judicial review have effectively been sealed.’170 
 A second campaigning journalist, Peter Hill also recognised that ‘the reputation of 
any legal system depends on its ability to produce finality.’171 However, he also stated that 
the Court has relied largely on its authority to produce finality, rather than the wisdom of its 
judgments. Hill states that to achieve finality there must be a more serious and thorough re-
investigation than cases are thoroughly subjected to, coupled with a change of attitude 
towards the trial process; he says that finality in some cases may have to be the result of a 
longer process than a simple trial and ‘inevitably such a process will need to be more 
inquisitorial than adversarial.’ The large numbers applying to the CCRC would seem to 
suggest that the Court is not particularly effective at promoting finality as these are cases 
that have largely been through the appeal process and failed. Therefore, whilst the Court 
may assume that its approach is conducive to promoting finality, the difficulties of its 
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decision-making process may actually prolong the process for many appellants who have to 
keep returning to the Court before they finally succeed in overturning the conviction. 
The Court’s review function and decision-making process can also contribute to a 
restrictive approach. If the reviewing of the conviction merely requires the Court to decide if 
there is evidence the jury could have convicted on, then fresh evidence appeals are at odds 
with this function. If new evidence was freely admitted on appeal then this would be straying 
into retrial territory which, as the Donovan Committee stated, was ‘a function which 
Parliament did not intend it to discharge, and for which it is in any event inadequately 
equipped.’ This prevents the Court looking into the merits of the case as it focuses on 
whether the jury could have convicted and not whether the jury should have convicted. This 
is most apparent in fresh evidence cases because the appellant is usually arguing there was 
a factual error in the sense that he/she did not commit the crime so an unsafe fresh evidence 
conviction is one more likely to be assumed to be factual innocence if overturned. That is not 
to say that the appellant is factually innocent in all fresh evidence appeals but if he/she is 
factually innocent then fresh evidence appeals are more likely to be the appeals that reflect 
this. 
A more interventionist approach may be required with more use of the power of the 
Court to hear the evidence de bene esse. This would mean the appellant not having the 
restriction of section 23 when deciding whether to admit the evidence and the Court perhaps 
being more persuaded by oral evidence than evidence given on paper. It is not clear from 
the judgments if this will be allowed so allowing this as a matter of procedure may improve 
fresh evidence appeals. The Court is clearly using the conditions in section 23(2) to admit 
the evidence rather than the broader condition in section 23(1) of in the interests of justice so 
abolishing section 23(2) may liberate fresh evidence appeals as this would require the Court 
to focus on the interests of justice rather than the restrictions when deciding to admit it. A 
further solution may be to give the Court the power to order a retrial or to quash the 
conviction as, at the moment, the Court has to quash before it can discuss the possibility for 
retrial. If the Court had the option of ordering a retrial or quashing the conviction this may 
benefit the appellant who currently has the conviction upheld because a retrial cannot be 
considered until the decision is made to quash the conviction. The Court may be more 
inclined to order a retrial if it does not have the hurdle of deciding to quash the conviction 
first.  
The Court was given wide powers under section 9 of the CAA 1907 to adduce 
evidence on appeal and it created its own restrictions so it would appear that initially it was 
the attitude of the judiciary that led to the problems. However, legislation then encapsulated 
those restrictions in section 23(2) which are now being used to limit the wide discretion the 
Court has under section 23(1) to admit evidence which was the fear of those who criticised 
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section 23 when it was enacted. Abolishing section 23(2) may solve this problem but not if 
the Court just imposes its own restrictions again through case law. Perhaps a more 
fundamental change is required to liberate fresh evidence appeals. It may now be time for a 
thorough review of the Court’s function as a court of review to remedy injustice so the 
Court’s powers are not continually changed with the hope of liberalising its approach only to 
be revisited when another crisis in criminal appeals appears in the future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
